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This is a

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live view of the Artemis II rocket
and spacecraft inside the Vehicle

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Assembly Building at NASA's
Kennedy Space Center in Florida.

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Today,
we'll discuss the outcome of this week's

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flight readiness review for Artemis II.

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Welcome,
and thank you for joining us today.

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I'm Rachel Kraft with NASA communications.

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And we're joined today by several NASA
managers who are going to share details

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about the outcome of the flight readiness
review and answer your questions.

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They are.

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Doctor Lori Glaze,
acting associate administrator

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for NASA's Exploration Systems
Development Mission Directorate.

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John Honeycutt,

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chair of the Artemis
II mission management team.

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Shawn Quinn, Exploration ground systems
program manager.

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And Norm Knight,
director of flight operations.

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So we'll have some opening remarks
from our panelists today.

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Then we'll get into question and answers
from both you here in the room, as well

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as on the phone.

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A reminder to those
who have joined us by phone.

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You can join the question queue
by pressing star one.

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And with that,
we'll start with Lori. Great.

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Thank you so much, Rachel.

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It's great to be here again with you all.

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And thank you so much, for the turnout.

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Thank you for being here

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and for the tremendous interest, 
sustained interest even in Artemis two.

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As Rachel

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said, we
just completed about a couple hours ago.

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We completed two days of discussions
as part of our Artemis

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two flight readiness review.

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The flight readiness review is our final

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big assessment
of our readiness for launch.

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Where we are going to
when we launch, fly for astronauts

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around the moon
and bring them home safely.

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An incredible amount of work,

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has gone into preparing for this test
flight, by thousands of people across

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our integrated team at the conclusion
of the flight readiness review. We.

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I'm sorry.

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I'll just say,

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during the flight readiness review,
we had extremely thorough discussions.

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Very open. Transparent.

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We talked a lot about our risk posture
and how we're mitigating those risks.

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We reviewed,
the challenges that we've had

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and how we've addressed them,
and we talked about the work that remains,

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what's left to do, and how we're going
to get through all of that.

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We were fortunate, to have our crew join

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us virtually for the review from Houston

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Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover,
Christina Cook, and Jeremy Hansen.

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Having them join us in this

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review really reinforced the importance
of having open, honest discussions

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about our path forward and about the risks
that we're asking them to take.

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At the conclusion of the FRR.

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All the teams polled
go to launch and fly Artemis

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to around the moon,
pending completion of some of the work.

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Before we roll out to the launch pad.

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Just a reminder to everybody.

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We talk about it
every time we we talk about this flight.

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It's a test flight.

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And it is not without risk.

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But our team and our hardware are ready.

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We are planning to roll out to the pad,

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back out to the pad, targeting next week.

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A week from today on the 19th.

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We are on track for that.

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Everything's going pretty well.

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Maybe even a little ahead of that, but, 
but we're we're shooting for the 19th.

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And then once we get back out to the pad,
we'll configure for launch,

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pending

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completion of the work in the VAB
and at the pad.

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We are on track for a launch

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as early as April 1st,

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and we are working toward that date.

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I will say the

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the launch time on the April
1st is at 6:24 p.m..

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I also wanted to note, I'm sure many of
you have seen our little calendar

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with the green dot, green squares on it

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that shows the available dates
for launches in April.

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We have also just continued
to refine our analyzes

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of launch availability
and are adding April 2nd.

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To to our calendar
of potential launch opportunities.

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And that early April launch period.

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The launch on

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the second would be at 7:22 p.m.

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within those, 
six days between the first and the sixth.

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We can't always turn around every day, 
for an attempt.

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We would anticipate on the order
of about four opportunities within

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that six day period.

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Again,
while I am comfortable and the agency

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is comfortable with targeting April 1st
as our first opportunity.

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Just keep in mind
we still have work to go.

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There are still things that need to be
done within the VAB and out at the pad.

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And as always, we'll always be guided
by what the hardware is telling us

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and we will launch when we're ready.

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I want to close just by saying how proud
I am of this amazing team,

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that is working
tirelessly to prepare to launch

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and fly our astronauts around the moon
and bring them home safely.

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That I'll hand it over to John.

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Okay. Thank you. Laura.

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Hello again.

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It's good to be back with you all today.

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And, it's even better for us
to be ready in the rocket,

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to get ready to roll out again
and launch this in launches mission.

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You know, probably over the last,

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seven days, pretty much on more than off.

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We spent a lot of time with

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the senior executives and the leadership

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throughout the enterprise talking about, 
my risk postures.

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Lori alluded to.

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But moreover,

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you know, looking at it
through the lens of an eye

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for an agency, IFR is really more like,

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it's talent telling the real story.

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And it's about how you communicated risk.

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So, Lori said, hey,

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we need to spend a few days
doing just that and kind of wire

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brushing the team so that we don't
put ourselves in a posture.

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What I always kind of talk to folks
about sometimes, don't bring me a kit

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and make me have to put it together
myself.

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You know, I wanted to be Chris Bong.

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Go on to this agency for more,

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and making sure that we had the kit
put together so that folks

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could understand that we were doing
our best job at communicating the risk

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associated with this mission.

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You know, over

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and over again,
we ask ourself, is a rocket ready to fly?

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Is a spacecraft ready to fly?

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Is the integrated team ready?

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You know, so,

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another piece that

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kind of drives into that is,

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I'm a I'm, it's been talking to us
for several months,

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about failure of imagination.

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I think we use that term
a lot in human spaceflight.

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Right.

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And so we want to be sure

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that we're thinking about everything
that can possibly go wrong.

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And have we, assessed and adjudicated

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all the risk
to put us in the best posture to be,

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successful?

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I was I, like Lori, was very pleased

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with the outcome of the flight readiness
review.

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It asked for dissenting opinions
at the end.

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We spent a little bit of quiet time
giving people plenty of time

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to come to the table
and share any, dissenting concerns.

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And there were none.

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We we
took some actions that they're for today.

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Some of those actions are. Do you.

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To be completed prior to rollout,
which I don't think it's a big deal.

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We'll just, just we got to get done.

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And then there's some
that will come to the L minus two when,

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the enterprise hands over the mission

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management to the MMT.

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And we it's like

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I said, we got a path
to close all the open actions.

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Either
prior to rollout or prior to launch.

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I spent a lot of time

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over the last, probably seven months,

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putting teams together to go look at risk
across all the individual elements

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of the enterprise and,
and how they stack up.

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And then and then once I got that data
put together by the teams,

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put together another team to go assist
all those integrated risk

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and how they interact with each other.

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From a top down perspective
and a bottoms up perspective had been,

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I was really pleased to report,
you know, that,

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we didn't find any new integrated

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risk interactions throughout that process.

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So just in closing,
I'll say that, you know,

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this is the first flight, like I've always
said, of humans in over 50 years.

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And to the moon.

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And that's certainly exciting.

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And I've always cautioned the team,

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and we won't do it,
and we're not going to celebrate,

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the small victory
that we had on getting through, therefore,

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which was quite a big deal.

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But it's just a step along the way

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that we're not going to celebrate
till we get read.

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And Victor and Christina
and Jeremy safely home.

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Thank you.
I'll turn it over to Sean. Right.

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Thank you very much, John.

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Well, first of all, it's
good to see everyone here today.

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It's really incredible
that we've set a new launch date

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to send our astronauts back to the moon
for the first time for 50 years.

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Exactly two weeks ago,
we had to roll back

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from the pad after a very successful
wet dress rehearsal.

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And, you know, it was,
it was frustrating

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to have the issue that we had, but,
you know, as you know, we had a problem,

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loading, helium on the upper stage.

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We got the vehicle back to the VAB, and,
we removed the suspect part.

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It was what we call quick
disconnect the helium, quick disconnect.

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And, we took it to our labs.

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We, X-rayed it,
and we found a seal blocking

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the flow of the helium through the QD.

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And so, at that point,

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you know, we set apart a path
to figure out the root cause.

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And so we set up some non flight units
down at our launch equipment test facility

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and proceeded to, duplicate
the conditions that we experienced,

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when we were trying to load
helium on board the upper stage.

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And we were able to replicate the problem.

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Since that time, our,
combined engineering teams across the,

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our ground systems and, SLS teams, 
came up with the design fix.

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That design fix
was implemented on a test article, and,

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we have successfully tested it,
and we have qualified it, for use

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on Artemis two, and the modified QD
is already on the upper stage.

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So, we're very proud of the team
and the work that they did to,

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and quickly understand the root cause
and come up with the corrective action

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and get us back in a posture
to roll back out.

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We've also, replaced the, 
flight termination system,

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batteries on the ISPs on the core stage
and the boosters.

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And, we are in the process
now of, testing,

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the flight termination system in the VAB.

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So far, the VAB processing has gone
very well.

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And, you know, as Laurie, mentioned,
we're targeting, March

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19th, the roll date.

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And should we meet that roll, which
we have fairly high confidence we are.

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It'll be the fastest turnaround
in the Artemis program.

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Since we started, you know, 22 days
from the time we rolled off

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the off the pads,
getting back out to the pad.

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During that time, we've also, charged
Orion's launch abort systems, batteries.

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We performed another closeout crew demo,

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in the VAB and, you know, closeout crew,
in getting them trained

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and making sure we hit our timelines, it's
very important for our launch countdown.

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And, we got it done in a little under
about two minutes,

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two hours and 40 minutes.

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And so we're meeting our closeout
crew timeline.

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And that was very good training.

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We also replaced the, liquid

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oxygen seals on the tail surface
mass umbilical.

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And so we thought why we had the time, 
given the experience we had with the,

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LH to, the hydrogen seals
would be a good idea to change those.

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So we did that. That's all completed.

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And, now we've committed to

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roll, again, on the 19th,

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we'll get the vehicle back out of the pad,
go through the pad, prep, set up our air

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system, raise the engine service platform,
you know, raise

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the extensible columns, do all that work,
and put a good, launch posture.

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I will tell you that, over a year ago,
we set out to launch.

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No, no, later than than April 2026.

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At challenge, just to get the vehicle
to the pad by February.

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We held schedule for an entire year.

241
00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:02,885
That's quite an accomplishment.

242
00:15:02,885 --> 00:15:05,888
For, all the programs
that are supporting Artemis.

243
00:15:06,639 --> 00:15:09,625
However, you know, we had the problem
with the helium disconnect,

244
00:15:09,625 --> 00:15:11,994
and we listened to the hardware
and said, we're not ready.

245
00:15:11,994 --> 00:15:12,995
Brought it back to fix it,

246
00:15:12,995 --> 00:15:17,366
and we're going to get back out there
for that launch attempt on on, April 1st.

247
00:15:17,700 --> 00:15:20,369
I will tell you that,
this processing flow,

248
00:15:20,369 --> 00:15:23,372
has gone very well
in terms of our timelines.

249
00:15:23,672 --> 00:15:28,978
And, you know, we spent half the time
in the Multi Payload

250
00:15:28,978 --> 00:15:33,449
Processing Facility to service, Orion,
as we did for, for the Artemis one flow.

251
00:15:33,899 --> 00:15:37,653
And we cut the time into the launch
abort systems facility, by a third.

252
00:15:38,070 --> 00:15:42,124
So we're learning, 
you know, we're all very excited,

253
00:15:42,124 --> 00:15:46,412
to implement the new, vision for Artemis
that our administrator has announced

254
00:15:46,779 --> 00:15:48,147
to increase our launch cadence.

255
00:15:48,147 --> 00:15:50,766
And I think Artemis
two is putting out us a good path.

256
00:15:50,766 --> 00:15:52,918
So it's good to be here.
And with that, I'll turn it over to Norm.

257
00:15:54,386 --> 00:15:54,803
All right.

258
00:15:54,803 --> 00:15:57,272
Well, thank you, Sean,
and really thank you to everyone

259
00:15:57,272 --> 00:16:00,275
for your continued interest
in this historic mission.

260
00:16:00,776 --> 00:16:04,647
You know, the flight readiness
review over these past two days was,

261
00:16:04,647 --> 00:16:09,034
excellent and really heavily
focused on crew risk and mission success.

262
00:16:10,052 --> 00:16:13,555
As you've heard, we remain on track
for an April launch opportunity.

263
00:16:14,707 --> 00:16:18,927
Our teams in Mission Control Houston are
fully prepared to support this mission.

264
00:16:19,294 --> 00:16:21,897
They've been training side by side
with the astronauts.

265
00:16:21,897 --> 00:16:25,768
Read Victor,
Christina, Jeremy through countless

266
00:16:25,768 --> 00:16:29,405
simulations
and really working through every scenario.

267
00:16:30,339 --> 00:16:32,524
The team is ready to support
both the astronauts

268
00:16:32,524 --> 00:16:35,995
and the spacecraft systems
through the journey around the moon to

269
00:16:35,995 --> 00:16:39,331
when they're reunited with their families
after splashdown.

270
00:16:40,315 --> 00:16:43,502
I talked with Reid this morning,
and the crew is an excellent shape

271
00:16:43,719 --> 00:16:45,204
and ready to fly.

272
00:16:45,204 --> 00:16:47,639
They've complete confidence in the ground.

273
00:16:47,639 --> 00:16:49,475
Team supporting them.

274
00:16:49,475 --> 00:16:52,378
They have built strong relationships
with our flight controllers

275
00:16:52,378 --> 00:16:55,864
and the integrated teams
over the course of their training flow.

276
00:16:57,182 --> 00:16:58,617
For an April 1st launch,

277
00:16:58,617 --> 00:17:04,556
the crew will begin prelaunch quarantine
at about L -14 days, which is March 18th,

278
00:17:05,557 --> 00:17:08,677
and will then travel here to the Kennedy
Space Center in L minus

279
00:17:08,677 --> 00:17:11,730
five days, which is March 27th.

280
00:17:13,015 --> 00:17:16,652
This is an exciting time
for our entire flight operations team

281
00:17:17,019 --> 00:17:21,090
to fly humans around the moon
for the first time in over 50 years.

282
00:17:21,757 --> 00:17:25,110
Send them further than any humans
since Apollo 13,

283
00:17:25,828 --> 00:17:30,149
and continue paving the road of human
exploration to the moon and beyond.

284
00:17:30,849 --> 00:17:35,337
As always, our astronauts
and their safety remain our top priority.

285
00:17:36,004 --> 00:17:38,907
With that, I'll hand it back to Rachel.

286
00:17:38,907 --> 00:17:40,743
All right. Thank you.

287
00:17:40,743 --> 00:17:41,076
All right.

288
00:17:41,076 --> 00:17:42,895
We'll start taking some questions.

289
00:17:42,895 --> 00:17:44,563
We will start here in the room.

290
00:17:44,563 --> 00:17:47,800
If you're here in the room,
please wait for the mic to come around.

291
00:17:48,133 --> 00:17:50,552
We'll also take some questions by phone.

292
00:17:50,552 --> 00:17:52,588
If you've joined us by phone.

293
00:17:52,588 --> 00:17:56,341
Please remember to star to press Star one
to get into the question queue.

294
00:17:56,608 --> 00:17:58,944
And with that, let's
start over here. Marcia Dunn,

295
00:18:00,129 --> 00:18:01,680
or should an Associated Press.

296
00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:04,316
I'd like to hear a little bit more
about how you fix this. Helium.

297
00:18:04,316 --> 00:18:07,920
What caused the cell
to block the flow of helium?

298
00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:10,105
And how do you redesign for that?

299
00:18:10,105 --> 00:18:12,124
And Laura, you mentioned April 2nd.

300
00:18:12,124 --> 00:18:15,277
Is that a new is that now a new date? Yes.

301
00:18:15,544 --> 00:18:18,330
And does that give us six tries
at the beginning of.

302
00:18:18,330 --> 00:18:20,816
So you didn't remove one? No. Perfect.

303
00:18:20,816 --> 00:18:22,434
Thank you. Got it.

304
00:18:22,434 --> 00:18:22,801
Yeah.

305
00:18:22,801 --> 00:18:26,221
So, without
trying to get overly complicated.

306
00:18:26,221 --> 00:18:31,326
So the, the quick, the quick disconnect
between the, upper stage and the ground.

307
00:18:31,326 --> 00:18:32,728
The ground umbilical.

308
00:18:32,728 --> 00:18:36,849
There are seals in there
to hold that helium, you know, in the,

309
00:18:36,932 --> 00:18:38,217
the pressure line.

310
00:18:38,217 --> 00:18:43,172
And, one of the seals occasionally would
get forced out of its location that it's

311
00:18:43,172 --> 00:18:47,826
supposed to be, and block the flow
through the quick disconnect itself.

312
00:18:47,993 --> 00:18:52,865
We actually ended up removing that seal
and reinforcing another seal.

313
00:18:52,865 --> 00:18:55,651
That would be less susceptible
to that phenomenon.

314
00:18:55,651 --> 00:18:59,488
And so, you know,
we had this buildup of high pressure gas

315
00:18:59,638 --> 00:19:03,242
after we invented the,
the helium bottles at high pressure

316
00:19:03,242 --> 00:19:06,512
gas force
that that what we call this body seal out.

317
00:19:07,045 --> 00:19:10,465
And we redesigned the channel around
another seal

318
00:19:10,465 --> 00:19:13,735
that also holds the pressure,
a secondary seal reinforce that.

319
00:19:14,319 --> 00:19:16,538
And we've tested it multiple times.

320
00:19:16,538 --> 00:19:20,325
We took that cut through some brutal test
to make sure it was going to work.

321
00:19:20,342 --> 00:19:23,679
And we feel pretty confident
about it for, Artemis to.

322
00:19:24,713 --> 00:19:24,963
Yeah.

323
00:19:24,963 --> 00:19:27,449
And then if I can provide
just an explicit answer to Marcia

324
00:19:27,449 --> 00:19:29,918
because I was shaking my head in the room
and just want to make sure

325
00:19:29,918 --> 00:19:34,656
everybody gets the answer, but that, yes,
we have added, the 2nd of April.

326
00:19:34,656 --> 00:19:36,909
That is a new date.
Previously had been excluded.

327
00:19:36,909 --> 00:19:40,145
We've done additional work,
and now we've done the enough analyzes

328
00:19:40,145 --> 00:19:42,848
to believe that that is a viable date.
So it's been added.

329
00:19:42,848 --> 00:19:44,099
And it is an add.

330
00:19:44,099 --> 00:19:45,667
We haven't taken any other dates away.

331
00:19:45,667 --> 00:19:48,654
We have six potential dates.

332
00:19:50,105 --> 00:19:53,108
Hey, Bill Harwood.

333
00:19:54,092 --> 00:19:55,477
Hi. Bill Harwood, CBS news.

334
00:19:55,477 --> 00:19:59,047
Since virtually all of you mentioned
the risk analysis for this mission,

335
00:19:59,665 --> 00:20:02,918
you know, the OIG last week
put a report out that put the risk of,

336
00:20:02,918 --> 00:20:06,205
of lunar operations at one inch 40
and the risk

337
00:20:06,205 --> 00:20:10,525
of a lunar mission from start
to finish at 1 in 40 or 1 in 30.

338
00:20:10,525 --> 00:20:11,443
I'm sorry.

339
00:20:11,443 --> 00:20:14,580
Is there a probabilistic risk assessment
for Artemis two?

340
00:20:14,613 --> 00:20:15,447
What are the numbers?

341
00:20:15,447 --> 00:20:16,865
Since you're talking about

342
00:20:16,865 --> 00:20:19,017
assessing the risks,
you've got to have some way to do that.

343
00:20:19,017 --> 00:20:23,605
So is there a number to put on this flight
in terms of what you consider

344
00:20:23,605 --> 00:20:25,958
acceptable risk. Take that one down.

345
00:20:27,726 --> 00:20:28,227
Yeah.

346
00:20:28,227 --> 00:20:31,230
So Bill it's we've

347
00:20:31,897 --> 00:20:35,467
we've grappled with this overall number
for a while.

348
00:20:35,467 --> 00:20:39,488
What I can
what I would say is we understand

349
00:20:40,539 --> 00:20:45,477
the risk associated
with the individual components,

350
00:20:46,295 --> 00:20:49,765
the subsystems
and then the overall systems.

351
00:20:50,515 --> 00:20:54,419
You know,
I think I talked to Dan, the Artemis

352
00:20:54,569 --> 00:20:58,323
one relative to, you know, new rockets.

353
00:20:58,957 --> 00:21:02,427
It's about a
it's a 1 in 2 chance to make it.

354
00:21:02,427 --> 00:21:02,844
Right.

355
00:21:02,844 --> 00:21:08,350
So I think we're looking
at this kind of qualitatively like,

356
00:21:10,052 --> 00:21:12,487
you know, I've done some
the I've done a lot of thinking

357
00:21:12,487 --> 00:21:14,339
in a lot of reading about okay.

358
00:21:14,339 --> 00:21:17,342
What does that mean
for us for Artemis two.

359
00:21:17,609 --> 00:21:21,129
And, you know,
there's a lot of variables there.

360
00:21:21,129 --> 00:21:21,546
Right?

361
00:21:21,546 --> 00:21:25,017
And it really depends on how quickly
you get back into flying.

362
00:21:25,867 --> 00:21:26,368
Right.

363
00:21:26,368 --> 00:21:30,422
And so you know, one of the variables is
we've we've got such a gap

364
00:21:30,422 --> 00:21:33,425
between Artemis one and autonomous two.

365
00:21:33,608 --> 00:21:37,479
And you don't have that cadence
kind of like

366
00:21:37,479 --> 00:21:42,150
we had in shuttle, you know, where we fly
sometimes 4 or 5 times a year, right?

367
00:21:43,719 --> 00:21:47,189
So Laura and I have talked about this
a lot, you know, and so the,

368
00:21:47,222 --> 00:21:51,093
you know, the numbers would tell you
just kind of qualitatively that,

369
00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:55,263
you know, it's it's probably a 1 in 50

370
00:21:56,431 --> 00:22:00,235
would be a good number
if you were really getting after and,

371
00:22:00,602 --> 00:22:05,007
and had a good cadence
on, on a second or third time.

372
00:22:05,007 --> 00:22:08,343
But with this, with this gap that we got,

373
00:22:09,828 --> 00:22:14,166
you know, it's probably, it's,
it's probably, it's probably not,

374
00:22:14,666 --> 00:22:19,171
you know, one in 1 in 50, it's probably
and it's probably not one and two,

375
00:22:19,171 --> 00:22:22,174
but it's probably like I'm
quoting Lori on this.

376
00:22:22,174 --> 00:22:25,744
It's, you know,
and I believe it to it's probably,

377
00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:29,014
it's probably closer to one and two

378
00:22:30,215 --> 00:22:32,918
that, you know and it's

379
00:22:32,918 --> 00:22:33,685
I don't know.

380
00:22:33,685 --> 00:22:36,688
Well that basically that basically means

381
00:22:36,688 --> 00:22:39,691
we're probably not one in 1 in 50 on,

382
00:22:39,775 --> 00:22:43,895
on on the mission
going exactly like we want to,

383
00:22:43,895 --> 00:22:48,683
but we're probably not wanting to,
like we were on the first flight.

384
00:22:49,317 --> 00:22:51,086
And that's that's what I would tell you.

385
00:22:52,087 --> 00:22:52,571
I mean,

386
00:22:52,571 --> 00:22:55,891
I think we're being really careful
not to really blame,

387
00:22:56,825 --> 00:22:59,978
probabilistic numbers on the table

388
00:23:00,579 --> 00:23:04,116
for this mission,
just given the small amount of data

389
00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:08,370
to just say anything you don't agree with
there you want.

390
00:23:08,370 --> 00:23:09,654
I had

391
00:23:09,654 --> 00:23:12,240
I guess the one thing I would add
is you asked specifically

392
00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:14,476
about the probabilistic risk assessment.

393
00:23:14,476 --> 00:23:18,413
We do those we have that are numbers.

394
00:23:18,647 --> 00:23:23,285
I think sometimes we get tricked
into believing that those numbers are

395
00:23:23,919 --> 00:23:28,857
somehow, really telling us something
critically important.

396
00:23:28,857 --> 00:23:29,825
I think they're valuable.

397
00:23:29,825 --> 00:23:31,259
I think we can do things

398
00:23:31,259 --> 00:23:34,913
in a relative sense to measure, 
what's more risky or less risky?

399
00:23:35,363 --> 00:23:37,215
But I agree with John,

400
00:23:37,215 --> 00:23:41,470
that in this sense, I think as we're
thinking this through, thinking about it

401
00:23:41,470 --> 00:23:45,273
as it's not the first flight,
but we're also not in a regular cadence.

402
00:23:45,273 --> 00:23:47,375
So we definitely have
significantly more risk

403
00:23:47,375 --> 00:23:50,695
than a mission, flight system
that's flying all the time.

404
00:23:51,146 --> 00:23:52,831
But I'm with him.

405
00:23:52,831 --> 00:23:54,783
I wouldn't actually put a number on it.

406
00:23:54,783 --> 00:23:57,752
You know, I, you know, I can
I can break it down

407
00:23:57,752 --> 00:24:01,022
in terms of the mission phases, right.

408
00:24:01,022 --> 00:24:02,574
You know, and I can tell you

409
00:24:02,574 --> 00:24:06,728
when we get the most dynamic activities
going on, like during ascent

410
00:24:07,262 --> 00:24:11,133
and then when we're doing those burns,
doing the perigee raise, and then we're

411
00:24:11,500 --> 00:24:12,267
doing the,

412
00:24:13,235 --> 00:24:14,219
the tail light

413
00:24:14,219 --> 00:24:17,339
burn, those are
those are going to be the times

414
00:24:17,556 --> 00:24:21,576
that we're introducing the most risk
into the into the whole mission.

415
00:24:22,194 --> 00:24:25,230
There's there's a lot of times
where we're steady state

416
00:24:25,230 --> 00:24:28,867
and we're going to be feeling pretty good
about what's going on in the mission.

417
00:24:29,134 --> 00:24:33,955
But at the end of the day,
we want to accomplish

418
00:24:33,955 --> 00:24:37,375
as many goals as we that we've laid out
for ourselves in the mission.

419
00:24:38,376 --> 00:24:43,014
But the main thing that I want to do is
I want to hit that damn entry interface

420
00:24:43,298 --> 00:24:46,501
right down the middle and make sure
that I'm bringing the crew home

421
00:24:46,501 --> 00:24:49,504
safely.

422
00:24:50,288 --> 00:24:50,922
Okay.

423
00:24:50,922 --> 00:24:51,840
Let's go.

424
00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:53,642
Second row Will Robinson.

425
00:24:53,642 --> 00:24:56,611
Smith.

426
00:24:56,611 --> 00:24:57,329
Height.

427
00:24:57,329 --> 00:24:59,881
Excuse me, will Robinson
Smith with Spaceflight now.

428
00:24:59,881 --> 00:25:02,317
Thanks for taking the time to
talk with us. Maybe just to

429
00:25:03,568 --> 00:25:04,469
clarify this, just to

430
00:25:04,469 --> 00:25:07,739
make sure that at least I'm
fully understanding what you're saying.

431
00:25:08,223 --> 00:25:12,093
So the one and two
is that essentially to say

432
00:25:12,093 --> 00:25:17,549
that there's a coin flip in the mission
going fully successfully as architected?

433
00:25:17,966 --> 00:25:21,953
And then just secondarily,
a quick follow up,

434
00:25:21,953 --> 00:25:26,458
we saw the VAB be evacuated earlier today
and there was some talk of a loud bang.

435
00:25:26,458 --> 00:25:29,227
Can you clarify what exactly happened?
Thanks.

436
00:25:29,227 --> 00:25:30,662
Can you get that in just a minute?

437
00:25:30,662 --> 00:25:34,499
So I don't I don't want
you walking out of here and saying that.

438
00:25:34,499 --> 00:25:36,818
I said, this
mission is a one and two, right?

439
00:25:36,818 --> 00:25:39,804
I'm just I'm saying
if you look at the data over time,

440
00:25:40,288 --> 00:25:43,975
over the lifespan of just building
new rockets, right,

441
00:25:43,975 --> 00:25:48,330
the data would show you
that one out of two is successful.

442
00:25:48,330 --> 00:25:50,649
You're only successful 50% of the time.

443
00:25:52,551 --> 00:25:53,401
I think we're in

444
00:25:53,401 --> 00:25:56,404
I think
we're in a much better position than that.

445
00:25:57,072 --> 00:25:59,257
And the only way

446
00:25:59,257 --> 00:26:02,911
that I can put us in a better place
than the 1 in 2

447
00:26:03,245 --> 00:26:07,249
is do what we've done
right, uncover all the risk,

448
00:26:07,265 --> 00:26:11,102
and make sure
we've done everything to buy down risk,

449
00:26:11,102 --> 00:26:14,222
give us options to work through challenges
that we've got.

450
00:26:18,326 --> 00:26:20,579
And and so and then at the,

451
00:26:20,579 --> 00:26:24,332
at the end of the day, it's,
it's going to be what it's going to be.

452
00:26:24,349 --> 00:26:28,403
No, I'm not being flippant about that
because these teams of

453
00:26:29,187 --> 00:26:31,106
the individuals are ready to go fly.

454
00:26:31,106 --> 00:26:35,543
We have spent a lot of time
working through our processes

455
00:26:35,577 --> 00:26:39,297
on the ground and for In-Space
and for launch,

456
00:26:39,331 --> 00:26:43,134
for landing
and recovery of teams are well practiced.

457
00:26:45,120 --> 00:26:47,555
There's probably not many scenarios

458
00:26:47,555 --> 00:26:50,558
that if things go fairly nominal,
that we don't understand.

459
00:26:51,426 --> 00:26:54,129
Norm and I talk about it a lot where,

460
00:26:54,129 --> 00:26:57,365
you know, we know we're going to get
a curveball thrown at us.

461
00:26:58,199 --> 00:27:01,853
And so then we just where we get away

462
00:27:01,870 --> 00:27:04,956
our options and assess the risk
that point in time.

463
00:27:04,956 --> 00:27:07,959
And then we'll we'll keep moving on.

464
00:27:09,294 --> 00:27:10,478
Okay.

465
00:27:10,478 --> 00:27:13,465
He'd get
he he'd get your bangs door in there.

466
00:27:14,049 --> 00:27:15,183
Well, let's see.

467
00:27:15,183 --> 00:27:18,536
So first of all, we don't know
exactly the cause of the loud noise.

468
00:27:18,803 --> 00:27:21,990
We had an what we call an access control
monitor here.

469
00:27:21,990 --> 00:27:25,377
It didn't know what it was, did
the right thing, pulled the fire alarm.

470
00:27:25,377 --> 00:27:28,596
We rolled the fire engines,
the fire department into the VAB.

471
00:27:29,397 --> 00:27:30,815
They did their normal,

472
00:27:30,815 --> 00:27:34,769
methodical checkouts that they do
when whenever a fire alarm is pulled.

473
00:27:35,253 --> 00:27:38,289
And we declared the building fire safe
shortly after that.

474
00:27:38,757 --> 00:27:41,826
And, you know, I, we don't know

475
00:27:41,826 --> 00:27:45,063
exactly where the bang came from,
but we went ahead and shut the,

476
00:27:45,597 --> 00:27:48,783
the VAB down, evacuated the personnel
and did the safety checks.

477
00:27:49,384 --> 00:27:51,786
We could not find any,

478
00:27:51,786 --> 00:27:54,789
you know, any any sign at all of the fire?

479
00:27:54,806 --> 00:27:57,008
The person also reported an odor.

480
00:27:57,008 --> 00:28:01,413
We think it may have come from a floor
drain and, declared again, declared

481
00:28:01,413 --> 00:28:04,749
a facility fire safe and brought our crews
back in to continue working.

482
00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:07,769
You know, I could speculate

483
00:28:07,769 --> 00:28:10,772
on what it was, and
I just don't want to do that right now.

484
00:28:10,889 --> 00:28:11,222
Okay?

485
00:28:12,173 --> 00:28:13,141
Yeah.

486
00:28:13,141 --> 00:28:13,625
All right. We'll

487
00:28:13,625 --> 00:28:17,045
take several questions from the phone
and then come back here in the room.

488
00:28:17,379 --> 00:28:20,815
First up, we have Jonathan Saari with Fox.

489
00:28:22,500 --> 00:28:24,719
Thank you so much for taking the time.

490
00:28:24,719 --> 00:28:27,689
This is for
whoever wants to take a forward look.

491
00:28:27,689 --> 00:28:29,557
Future Artemis missions.

492
00:28:29,557 --> 00:28:32,911
Artemis four
and beyond the human landing system.

493
00:28:33,244 --> 00:28:37,148
The OIG report raises concerns
over the elevator.

494
00:28:37,148 --> 00:28:41,703
In the Starship HLS,
being the only way for astronauts

495
00:28:41,703 --> 00:28:44,906
to move between the surface
and the crew compartment.

496
00:28:45,573 --> 00:28:49,527
What options for a backup is NASA
exploring?

497
00:28:51,212 --> 00:28:54,032
I'm not sure if you're asking
about a backup to the elevator

498
00:28:54,032 --> 00:28:55,683
or a backup to the starship.

499
00:28:55,683 --> 00:28:58,987
I mean, certainly we do have, two options
in our human

500
00:28:58,987 --> 00:29:03,224
landing system program, 
to to provide landers to the surface.

501
00:29:03,241 --> 00:29:06,578
We've got both the starship
from space, and we have the,

502
00:29:07,629 --> 00:29:08,229
anticipated

503
00:29:08,229 --> 00:29:11,216
Mach two eventually for,
from Blue Origin,

504
00:29:11,366 --> 00:29:14,519
for the other lander
that we have on contract.

505
00:29:15,069 --> 00:29:20,458
Both of them will have to demonstrate,
not only the successful landing

506
00:29:20,458 --> 00:29:24,896
and ability to an uncrewed landing and, 
asset from the surface of the moon

507
00:29:24,896 --> 00:29:27,899
before we commit
to putting our crew on there.

508
00:29:27,899 --> 00:29:30,502
But they're going to have to demonstrate,

509
00:29:30,502 --> 00:29:33,688
that they are qualified for human flight.

510
00:29:33,972 --> 00:29:38,610
And that is going to require, the safety
and the backup systems

511
00:29:38,610 --> 00:29:41,613
and the redundancies that are going
to be required to keep the crew safe.

512
00:29:44,466 --> 00:29:45,066
Okay.

513
00:29:45,066 --> 00:29:48,369
Next question we have on
the phone is from Jackie Waddles

514
00:29:48,369 --> 00:29:51,356
with CNN.

515
00:29:51,539 --> 00:29:52,106
Hi there.

516
00:29:52,106 --> 00:29:53,558
Thanks for taking my question.

517
00:29:53,558 --> 00:29:57,362
As for John Hunnicutt,
I just I think it might help us,

518
00:29:57,362 --> 00:30:00,365
better understand these risk assessments.

519
00:30:00,598 --> 00:30:04,419
Can you just clarify again
what exactly you mean by the one and two?

520
00:30:04,419 --> 00:30:09,023
I, again, is that the risk of this mission
not going exactly to plan?

521
00:30:09,457 --> 00:30:13,111
And I know, you know, from covering demo
two and also going back to shuttle,

522
00:30:13,111 --> 00:30:17,799
we're used to having numbers for odds
of loss of mission and loss of crew.

523
00:30:18,266 --> 00:30:20,034
Do you have any calculations

524
00:30:20,034 --> 00:30:23,605
for those specific parameters,
that you can share with us?

525
00:30:23,905 --> 00:30:25,857
Some clarity on that would be great.

526
00:30:25,857 --> 00:30:28,977
And then if you don't mind quickly for
for Lori, you mentioned

527
00:30:28,977 --> 00:30:31,980
that the crew was present
at the flight readiness review.

528
00:30:32,347 --> 00:30:34,716
Could you give us some insight
into what they may

529
00:30:34,716 --> 00:30:36,868
have brought up during the flight
readiness review?

530
00:30:36,868 --> 00:30:39,754
Any questions and concerns
they may have raised? Thank you so much.

531
00:30:40,989 --> 00:30:41,739
On the Jeep.

532
00:30:41,739 --> 00:30:43,758
Yeah, you can go first. I'll go first.

533
00:30:43,758 --> 00:30:45,059
Yeah.

534
00:30:45,059 --> 00:30:48,213
It was wonderful to to have them,
they were virtual.

535
00:30:48,213 --> 00:30:53,518
They were online, but all four, 
were together, gathered together, online.

536
00:30:53,518 --> 00:30:56,521
And they did kick us off with our
for our yesterday

537
00:30:56,521 --> 00:31:00,008
morning, by by saying a few words to us.

538
00:31:00,008 --> 00:31:03,294
And they did convey
some of the things that they think about

539
00:31:03,294 --> 00:31:05,763
and the things that they worry about
as the crew members,

540
00:31:05,763 --> 00:31:08,283
the kinds of risks
that were of most concern to them

541
00:31:08,283 --> 00:31:11,336
and the things that basically
they were going to be listening for.

542
00:31:11,369 --> 00:31:13,705
As we went through the FRC,

543
00:31:13,705 --> 00:31:16,374
you know, they included things
that I'm sure won't surprise most of you,

544
00:31:16,374 --> 00:31:19,827
things like, you know,
the, the heat shield, but not so much

545
00:31:20,161 --> 00:31:21,296
the performance of the heat shield.

546
00:31:21,296 --> 00:31:24,098
I think we've all agreed
that we've got a good heat shield.

547
00:31:24,098 --> 00:31:27,118
The question was, are we going to be able
to hit that entry interface,

548
00:31:27,435 --> 00:31:31,856
and get the get them,
get them back on, on Earth safely.

549
00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:34,859
And so they were listening to make sure
that we have that really nailed down.

550
00:31:34,859 --> 00:31:35,693
And we were going to be able to hit

551
00:31:35,693 --> 00:31:40,448
that entry interface, understanding, 
communications challenges,

552
00:31:40,448 --> 00:31:44,852
and making sure that they'll be able
to maintain, communication with Earth.

553
00:31:44,852 --> 00:31:47,555
And that's one of the things
they were looking at, those risks, the,

554
00:31:47,555 --> 00:31:51,276
the environmental control
and life support systems,

555
00:31:51,276 --> 00:31:55,079
you know, power systems, things like that,
the things that that could cause,

556
00:31:55,647 --> 00:31:58,199
could cause some challenges to them
while they're in flight.

557
00:31:58,199 --> 00:32:01,202
So we really appreciated them
sharing their thoughts with us.

558
00:32:01,486 --> 00:32:04,289
I will also share, I think
one of the things that they mentioned

559
00:32:04,289 --> 00:32:09,277
was, you know, we spent the last, 
25 years in low Earth orbit,

560
00:32:09,277 --> 00:32:13,348
and they wanted us to make sure that
we all recognized as the board members

561
00:32:13,765 --> 00:32:15,366
that this mission is different.

562
00:32:15,366 --> 00:32:17,585
We are going well beyond low-Earth orbit.

563
00:32:17,585 --> 00:32:21,572
We're going out to the moon,
and we can't always rely on our experience

564
00:32:21,572 --> 00:32:24,726
in low Earth orbit when we're taking
this, this kind of a mission

565
00:32:26,344 --> 00:32:26,761
guide.

566
00:32:26,761 --> 00:32:28,146
Let me make another run at this.

567
00:32:28,146 --> 00:32:30,898
I've had a little bit of time to think

568
00:32:30,898 --> 00:32:32,333
again.

569
00:32:32,333 --> 00:32:36,154
All right,
so on the one and two, all I'm saying is,

570
00:32:36,504 --> 00:32:40,224
when you don't have a, when you don't
have a lot of data to pick from

571
00:32:40,224 --> 00:32:43,561
and you want to go generate
a, a probabilistic number.

572
00:32:46,014 --> 00:32:47,515
The way I got to one and two

573
00:32:47,515 --> 00:32:52,053
is you just go look at look at the rockets
that flew the first their first mission.

574
00:32:52,053 --> 00:32:55,056
Right. How many of them were successful.

575
00:32:55,506 --> 00:32:57,508
It's one and it's about one and two.

576
00:32:57,508 --> 00:33:00,511
Right. And so and so people

577
00:33:00,928 --> 00:33:03,931
I don't want people to take that as being,

578
00:33:07,385 --> 00:33:09,337
That we should be scared to go fly

579
00:33:09,337 --> 00:33:12,323
because we're not scared to go fly.

580
00:33:13,408 --> 00:33:16,411
We do a, an outstanding job

581
00:33:16,627 --> 00:33:20,465
of understanding the risks
by down the risk, mitigating the risk.

582
00:33:20,465 --> 00:33:22,950
And putting together
controls to manage the risk.

583
00:33:24,118 --> 00:33:28,589
But I think
you get in, I think you get in trouble.

584
00:33:28,589 --> 00:33:30,124
And we had a little bit of conversation

585
00:33:30,124 --> 00:33:33,244
on this today
at the for not not specifically about

586
00:33:34,295 --> 00:33:38,933
kind of indirectly about talking
about generating probabilistic numbers.

587
00:33:38,933 --> 00:33:40,284
Right.

588
00:33:40,284 --> 00:33:43,087
And so,

589
00:33:43,087 --> 00:33:46,107
you can
you can use a probabilistic assessment

590
00:33:46,958 --> 00:33:50,194
in a way that that might scare you
unless you go

591
00:33:50,194 --> 00:33:55,466
look at, for instance,
take for example, losing foam.

592
00:33:55,466 --> 00:33:55,800
Right.

593
00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:57,418
And so

594
00:33:57,418 --> 00:34:00,421
you can say, okay, there's

595
00:34:02,223 --> 00:34:05,526
X and Y a chance that I'm going to lose
foam off the rocket.

596
00:34:05,643 --> 00:34:08,079
Okay.
But then something else has got to happen.

597
00:34:08,079 --> 00:34:10,865
It's got to be
it's got to be there in the right place.

598
00:34:10,865 --> 00:34:12,784
And then you got to work to the machine.

599
00:34:12,784 --> 00:34:14,585
What? It's in that area.

600
00:34:14,585 --> 00:34:17,438
Based on the analysis we can do.
What's going to hit?

601
00:34:17,438 --> 00:34:19,073
What if it does hit that?

602
00:34:19,073 --> 00:34:20,341
What can it do?

603
00:34:20,341 --> 00:34:23,528
And so,
you know, when you work through all that

604
00:34:23,528 --> 00:34:28,232
from a technical standpoint, point you
you can put yourself in a better place

605
00:34:28,833 --> 00:34:32,937
rather than, than just solely relying
on a probabilistic number.

606
00:34:32,937 --> 00:34:36,808
And Bill, I totally get what you're saying
because we used to in shuttle,

607
00:34:36,808 --> 00:34:40,595
we used to have a, one in, in, number

608
00:34:40,595 --> 00:34:46,584
for loss of mission and one in, in
number for loss of crew and,

609
00:34:47,685 --> 00:34:51,689
you know, I think those numbers,

610
00:34:52,607 --> 00:34:56,194
I don't go back to this one.

611
00:34:56,194 --> 00:34:59,197
I started probably around

612
00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:02,283
this year, 36 after challenger.

613
00:35:02,433 --> 00:35:06,237
But, you know, those numbers
were always a one and n not Norm.

614
00:35:06,237 --> 00:35:08,189
You might remember how they were.

615
00:35:08,189 --> 00:35:13,644
The range was about,
you know, a 1 in 131 and 140.

616
00:35:13,644 --> 00:35:15,746
And it improved over time. Right.

617
00:35:15,746 --> 00:35:19,050
And if and it's driven by the stuff
that you do to make

618
00:35:19,050 --> 00:35:23,304
the launch vehicle or the rocket better
and put you better safe

619
00:35:23,304 --> 00:35:26,574
in a better position
to mitigate the challenges that you got.

620
00:35:27,542 --> 00:35:30,545
So, you know, it's just.

621
00:35:31,829 --> 00:35:34,298
I just I feel like we're

622
00:35:34,298 --> 00:35:36,634
we're kind of going
we're being a little bit dangerous.

623
00:35:36,634 --> 00:35:41,305
And, and it's interesting that I didn't
get this question asking me about it

624
00:35:41,305 --> 00:35:43,774
too much. When we on Artemis one. Right.

625
00:35:45,059 --> 00:35:46,327
But and I understand why.

626
00:35:46,327 --> 00:35:46,627
Right.

627
00:35:46,627 --> 00:35:50,548
We get people on the rocket
this time to have people go, oh.

628
00:35:51,115 --> 00:35:54,118
Pardon my French, but,
you know, it's just like,

629
00:35:55,469 --> 00:35:56,854
how can that be? Right?

630
00:35:56,854 --> 00:36:00,391
Well, it's just it's it's looking at that,
looking at the data.

631
00:36:01,826 --> 00:36:04,378
So it's

632
00:36:04,378 --> 00:36:08,132
we can we can probably pursue

633
00:36:09,150 --> 00:36:12,503
I know we have pursued,

634
00:36:12,503 --> 00:36:15,506
loss of mission,
loss of crew type number assessments,

635
00:36:16,774 --> 00:36:21,629
but I'm not sure we understand
what they mean in reality.

636
00:36:21,896 --> 00:36:23,514
And I'll give you an example. Right.

637
00:36:23,514 --> 00:36:26,634
You know what the biggest risk
we got right now in the enterprise?

638
00:36:28,769 --> 00:36:31,772
Micrometeorite debris.

639
00:36:32,557 --> 00:36:33,241
That's it.

640
00:36:33,241 --> 00:36:35,560
Right now, in my mind.

641
00:36:35,560 --> 00:36:36,961
Is that real?

642
00:36:36,961 --> 00:36:37,745
It's real.

643
00:36:37,745 --> 00:36:40,231
Right.

644
00:36:40,231 --> 00:36:43,234
But when it when if the last two

645
00:36:44,402 --> 00:36:46,954
bad events occurred

646
00:36:46,954 --> 00:36:47,939
going uphill

647
00:36:49,056 --> 00:36:50,491
in that

648
00:36:50,491 --> 00:36:53,494
highly energetic event,

649
00:36:53,544 --> 00:36:55,796
that's when it that's
when it that's when it occurred.

650
00:36:55,796 --> 00:36:56,097
Right.

651
00:36:56,097 --> 00:37:00,117
So, you know, we can fool ourselves
sometimes into thinking

652
00:37:00,117 --> 00:37:03,337
really is it is that the biggest risk
to the mission IMO

653
00:37:04,405 --> 00:37:06,691
everybody

654
00:37:06,691 --> 00:37:08,709
that's

655
00:37:08,709 --> 00:37:09,010
okay.

656
00:37:09,010 --> 00:37:11,996
So I'll make some good
reading over the next few days.

657
00:37:12,546 --> 00:37:13,414
Okay.

658
00:37:13,414 --> 00:37:17,251
We'll take another from the phone
from Josh, dinner with Space.com.

659
00:37:19,053 --> 00:37:20,738
Hi. Thanks so much for doing this.

660
00:37:20,738 --> 00:37:25,226
You've talked in the past
about the stress roll out can have on SLS,

661
00:37:25,743 --> 00:37:28,746
and I didn't hear a mention of another wet
dress rehearsal.

662
00:37:29,163 --> 00:37:32,283
What would be the justification
for skipping another wet dress?

663
00:37:32,283 --> 00:37:36,037
And will you have any way to assess
that helium qty back at the pad?

664
00:37:37,655 --> 00:37:39,607
So I'll take the first part of that.

665
00:37:39,607 --> 00:37:43,678
As far as the, the wet dress, 
and we've had a lot of discussion

666
00:37:43,678 --> 00:37:48,783
about this,
every time, we tank, tank the vehicle,

667
00:37:48,883 --> 00:37:51,619
it takes a little bit of the life
out of those tanks.

668
00:37:51,619 --> 00:37:54,055
And so we want to
we certainly want to test

669
00:37:54,055 --> 00:37:56,123
to always make sure that everything's
working.

670
00:37:56,123 --> 00:38:00,127
But, you know, we've now, done
a couple of wet dress rehearsals, we've

671
00:38:00,127 --> 00:38:03,114
exercised
the team, we've exercised the hardware,

672
00:38:03,180 --> 00:38:06,934
and, and I'll just tell you
from my perspective,

673
00:38:06,934 --> 00:38:09,654
when we tank the vehicle,
the very next time,

674
00:38:09,654 --> 00:38:12,657
I would like it to be on a day
that we could actually launch.

675
00:38:12,690 --> 00:38:14,275
I would like to do it on launch day.

676
00:38:14,275 --> 00:38:17,912
And if we successfully are able
to successfully fully tank the vehicle,

677
00:38:18,696 --> 00:38:21,549
I want to be able to pull go to launch.

678
00:38:21,549 --> 00:38:23,868
So so that's where we are at this point.

679
00:38:23,868 --> 00:38:27,538
And you know, we don't want to give up
any of the days in our April launch

680
00:38:27,538 --> 00:38:30,691
window, on for a wet dress rehearsal.

681
00:38:32,727 --> 00:38:34,261
And as far as,

682
00:38:34,261 --> 00:38:38,015
testing the QED at the pad, well,
we've already tested

683
00:38:38,015 --> 00:38:42,603
the new chassis in the VAB
as part of our pre-launch checkouts.

684
00:38:42,703 --> 00:38:46,807
We do pressurize the helium bottles,
and we exercise

685
00:38:46,807 --> 00:38:48,509
the helium system on the upper stage.

686
00:38:48,509 --> 00:38:51,579
So we've already verified
that the new QD is,

687
00:38:51,579 --> 00:38:54,565
is working in the VAB already.

688
00:38:55,416 --> 00:38:57,034
We'll take one more question
from the phone,

689
00:38:57,034 --> 00:38:58,986
and then we'll come back here in the room.

690
00:38:58,986 --> 00:39:01,689
Next up we have, Katrina miller

691
00:39:01,689 --> 00:39:04,675
from The New York Times.

692
00:39:05,843 --> 00:39:07,395
Hi. Thanks so much.

693
00:39:07,395 --> 00:39:10,798
I was curious
for anyone who wants to answer,

694
00:39:10,798 --> 00:39:13,918
can you go into a little bit
of the specifics on what work needs to be

695
00:39:13,918 --> 00:39:17,138
completed, prior to the rollout

696
00:39:17,138 --> 00:39:21,125
and then prior to the launch
to be ready to launch April 1st?

697
00:39:21,308 --> 00:39:21,776
Thank you.

698
00:39:24,211 --> 00:39:26,897
I've got it.

699
00:39:26,897 --> 00:39:29,900
I think
I can I can talk about a little bit about,

700
00:39:30,501 --> 00:39:32,903
the things that I'm looking forward

701
00:39:32,903 --> 00:39:36,774
to seeing over the next, weeks to come.

702
00:39:36,857 --> 00:39:39,927
One of the things that
that we got to get worked out is

703
00:39:39,927 --> 00:39:42,930
we've we found a little bit of,

704
00:39:43,114 --> 00:39:45,332
interest to get some interesting data on

705
00:39:45,332 --> 00:39:48,335
some of the,

706
00:39:48,386 --> 00:39:49,537
thrust vector control

707
00:39:49,537 --> 00:39:52,523
actuators
that are in fabrication up at Moog

708
00:39:52,706 --> 00:39:55,709
right now for Artemis three.

709
00:39:56,243 --> 00:39:59,513
So we got to go figure out
kind of what that means to this mission.

710
00:39:59,513 --> 00:40:00,748
I don't I don't think it's

711
00:40:00,748 --> 00:40:04,235
I don't think it's a big deal,
but it's just doing the analytical work,

712
00:40:05,019 --> 00:40:08,973
to close it out
and make sure that the little bit of issue

713
00:40:08,973 --> 00:40:12,309
they're seeing up and on, on the actual
shrouded in mystery,

714
00:40:12,993 --> 00:40:16,464
doesn't indict the Artemis

715
00:40:16,614 --> 00:40:20,768
two actuator ideas,
which are shuttle heritage.

716
00:40:20,768 --> 00:40:23,437
Right. So we had two sets actuated.

717
00:40:23,437 --> 00:40:26,424
We used one on our
in which one we're using the second,

718
00:40:26,490 --> 00:40:29,243
the second, group on Artemis three.

719
00:40:29,243 --> 00:40:32,663
And then all the subsequent ones are going
to, are going to be new.

720
00:40:33,247 --> 00:40:37,318
Our inertial navigation
and control assembly

721
00:40:38,886 --> 00:40:40,805
on Artemis two.

722
00:40:40,805 --> 00:40:44,525
ULA ran
into a little bit of a problem and

723
00:40:44,525 --> 00:40:47,528
and they solved it by doing a,
a good burn

724
00:40:47,528 --> 00:40:50,514
in with the Anca.

725
00:40:50,514 --> 00:40:51,932
On one of the channels,

726
00:40:51,932 --> 00:40:55,686
they they were experiencing
some some issue.

727
00:40:55,686 --> 00:40:59,190
I'm not I'm not sure I can communicate
what the issue was, was basically

728
00:40:59,190 --> 00:41:03,677
they recommended we do a good burn in on
the Indian Jones teams.

729
00:41:03,694 --> 00:41:05,679
We've already we've already started that.

730
00:41:05,679 --> 00:41:08,666
And so we got a good plan
to get that closed out.

731
00:41:08,999 --> 00:41:12,570
And then Sean Sean
can share more on this one.

732
00:41:12,570 --> 00:41:15,573
But he's been working.

733
00:41:15,656 --> 00:41:18,659
Y'all have heard about comm problems
that we've had off and on through

734
00:41:19,477 --> 00:41:22,863
throughout our wet dress rehearsals
and, and his team's off work,

735
00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:26,934
and they've done an outstanding job
by down risk relative to that.

736
00:41:26,934 --> 00:41:30,454
So those are kind of the
three big ones on on my radar.

737
00:41:30,454 --> 00:41:32,556
He can talk to you about his

738
00:41:32,556 --> 00:41:36,110
kind of standard work, but I don't view
the standard work as a big deal.

739
00:41:36,126 --> 00:41:38,696
He talked about his schedule.
So where do you show?

740
00:41:38,696 --> 00:41:38,979
Yeah.

741
00:41:38,979 --> 00:41:42,833
So really, the, like I said earlier,
the working VAB is going very well.

742
00:41:42,867 --> 00:41:45,386
We're actually slightly ahead of schedule.

743
00:41:45,386 --> 00:41:46,654
What's remaining really

744
00:41:46,654 --> 00:41:49,857
is the, what we call the flight
termination system and checkouts.

745
00:41:50,491 --> 00:41:51,542
And we'll do those over

746
00:41:51,542 --> 00:41:55,229
the next several days, and then we will do
what we call close up the volumes.

747
00:41:55,229 --> 00:42:01,435
We will remove excess platforms from
the Livesay area and from the, core stage.

748
00:42:01,435 --> 00:42:05,589
And the, left
and right hand solid rocket boosters

749
00:42:05,606 --> 00:42:09,126
and, 
get the doors locked up and ready to roll.

750
00:42:09,126 --> 00:42:12,446
So there's not a whole lot of, 
work left in the VAB.

751
00:42:12,446 --> 00:42:16,567
Fortunately, you know, the,
Yeah, that's pretty much it.

752
00:42:16,834 --> 00:42:18,185
So we're close.

753
00:42:20,104 --> 00:42:21,205
Okay, we'll come back

754
00:42:21,205 --> 00:42:24,475
here in the room, we'll go on this side
and let's start here with the black shirt.

755
00:42:24,508 --> 00:42:25,893
Thank you.

756
00:42:25,893 --> 00:42:27,094
From a close unit.

757
00:42:27,094 --> 00:42:28,078
Two quick questions.

758
00:42:28,078 --> 00:42:29,713
First one for the panel.

759
00:42:29,713 --> 00:42:33,183
The OAG report says
that NASA is tracking,

760
00:42:33,183 --> 00:42:36,186
like, a risk
with one of the cryogenic technologies.

761
00:42:36,186 --> 00:42:39,990
So SpaceX is using for the HLS,
but it doesn't mention which one.

762
00:42:39,990 --> 00:42:41,008
Can you elaborate?

763
00:42:41,008 --> 00:42:42,960
Which technology is NASA tracking?

764
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:47,014
Which is not going to be mature
enough for other mystery

765
00:42:47,014 --> 00:42:50,851
in this case will be Artemis for
and then maybe for Lori.

766
00:42:50,851 --> 00:42:55,089
What would be the status of the gateway
given the new architecture is the gateway?

767
00:42:55,089 --> 00:42:57,308
Is the lunar base the new gateway?

768
00:42:57,308 --> 00:42:59,076
Let me take those separately.

769
00:42:59,076 --> 00:43:02,813
In your first question, I'm going to say
we'll have to get back to you.

770
00:43:03,213 --> 00:43:05,883
I'm, I would have to go back
and read the details of what's

771
00:43:05,883 --> 00:43:08,168
in the OIG report to understand
what exactly they're.

772
00:43:08,168 --> 00:43:12,773
And I don't want to speculate on
on that particular, question.

773
00:43:13,107 --> 00:43:17,428
On the second question,
the the new direction

774
00:43:17,428 --> 00:43:21,815
that the administrator,
put forward a couple of weeks ago,

775
00:43:21,815 --> 00:43:26,670
that is very focused on the transportation
systems in the near term.

776
00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:30,174
It's focused on standardizing
our transportation to and from the moon.

777
00:43:30,758 --> 00:43:33,627
We there's nothing in there
that says anything about what?

778
00:43:33,627 --> 00:43:36,363
What is, anticipated
for any other parts of our program?

779
00:43:36,363 --> 00:43:38,649
We continue to execute
on the other parts of our program.

780
00:43:40,501 --> 00:43:41,785
Okay.

781
00:43:41,785 --> 00:43:44,788
Let's go here to Ken.

782
00:43:47,224 --> 00:43:48,025
All right.

783
00:43:48,025 --> 00:43:49,627
Ken Kramer, SpaceX up close.

784
00:43:49,627 --> 00:43:51,178
Thanks for doing all this.

785
00:43:51,178 --> 00:43:53,464
A lot of good information.

786
00:43:53,464 --> 00:43:56,467
Norm, you haven't had a question
I could ask you all question.

787
00:43:56,467 --> 00:44:01,588
Let me let me ask you about the,
the ISPs I'd like to know.

788
00:44:01,588 --> 00:44:04,775
Can you describe in detail
the burns that it has to make?

789
00:44:05,225 --> 00:44:08,729
And if there's an issue,
how long can they stay

790
00:44:08,729 --> 00:44:11,732
in orbit for?

791
00:44:12,449 --> 00:44:13,567
Before they can go to the moon?

792
00:44:13,567 --> 00:44:15,386
Or do they have to abort the moon?

793
00:44:15,386 --> 00:44:16,253
Thanks.

794
00:44:16,253 --> 00:44:17,938
Okay. Well, thanks for your question.

795
00:44:17,938 --> 00:44:19,256
The first.

796
00:44:19,256 --> 00:44:23,344
So they get into orbit,
they, SLS does this job,

797
00:44:23,761 --> 00:44:26,764
gets, gets Orion and the ICP into orbit.

798
00:44:27,398 --> 00:44:31,201
So the first big burn that they're going
to do is an apogee raise burn.

799
00:44:31,468 --> 00:44:35,289
And that is one
that, puts our apogee way out there

800
00:44:35,289 --> 00:44:38,275
about 3000km, give or take.

801
00:44:38,575 --> 00:44:40,744
That's what I CPS provides.

802
00:44:40,744 --> 00:44:44,581
After that, I will separate
and they'll do approx.

803
00:44:44,581 --> 00:44:48,635
I call it a prox demo, proximity demo.

804
00:44:49,286 --> 00:44:53,107
And and so they'll actually do
some inspections of it

805
00:44:53,607 --> 00:44:56,427
and do the handling qualities of Orion
around it.

806
00:44:56,427 --> 00:45:01,448
So that's its
major burn, to get to get Orion

807
00:45:01,448 --> 00:45:04,685
where it needs to get in that first,
we call it a geo orbit.

808
00:45:05,369 --> 00:45:09,490
So and then your second question,
I think, was, you know what?

809
00:45:09,773 --> 00:45:12,126
How long can the crew stay up there?

810
00:45:12,126 --> 00:45:12,309
Okay.

811
00:45:12,309 --> 00:45:14,728
The firm doesn't work. Well,
what are your options?

812
00:45:14,728 --> 00:45:18,899
Well, if that burn doesn't work,
then you have aborts back to Earth.

813
00:45:19,083 --> 00:45:22,286
And so you would separate from it
and come back.

814
00:45:22,619 --> 00:45:25,622
Obviously, the first thing we would do
is try to get into a safe orbit

815
00:45:25,923 --> 00:45:27,274
as best we could.

816
00:45:27,274 --> 00:45:31,929
And once you're in a safe orbit, we would
assess probably in a low Earth orbit,

817
00:45:32,579 --> 00:45:36,633
because that gives you a matter of hours
to get the crew back home.

818
00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:39,937
Once you commit to the high, Earth orbit,

819
00:45:40,404 --> 00:45:43,056
it's, it's about a day to get back home.

820
00:45:43,056 --> 00:45:46,059
So obviously,
there's a lot of risk trades that you do.

821
00:45:46,076 --> 00:45:49,113
There are a lot of different scenarios
that play out associated with that.

822
00:45:49,563 --> 00:45:52,566
But what the team does that
they look at the failure, the impact,

823
00:45:52,616 --> 00:45:53,484
and then the workaround

824
00:45:53,484 --> 00:45:57,571
and the risk trades relative
to always keeping crew safety paramount.

825
00:45:57,938 --> 00:45:59,757
Vehicle safety.

826
00:45:59,757 --> 00:46:03,877
Next
and all those factor in to the decision

827
00:46:03,877 --> 00:46:06,964
making,
that we as a collective team would go do.

828
00:46:09,399 --> 00:46:09,716
Okay.

829
00:46:09,716 --> 00:46:13,320
We'll go, back again to the phone
for several more questions.

830
00:46:13,704 --> 00:46:16,707
Next is Loren Grush with Bloomberg.

831
00:46:18,842 --> 00:46:21,128
Thank you so much for taking my question.

832
00:46:21,128 --> 00:46:25,048
I'm wondering if there has been any extra
scrutiny lately

833
00:46:25,048 --> 00:46:27,367
on the solid rocket boosters.

834
00:46:27,367 --> 00:46:29,553
I understand
they're probably very different designs,

835
00:46:29,553 --> 00:46:32,606
but just for peace of mind,
you know, two Vulcan flights now

836
00:46:32,606 --> 00:46:36,009
have suffered issues with their Northrop
Grumman built boosters.

837
00:46:36,009 --> 00:46:39,296
And then there was also an issue
with the NASA booster test last year.

838
00:46:39,696 --> 00:46:42,149
I understand they might be disconnected,
but wondering if that has prompted

839
00:46:42,149 --> 00:46:45,152
any closer look at the designs,
or if you feel confident

840
00:46:45,219 --> 00:46:46,470
the ones you have are ready to go.

841
00:46:46,470 --> 00:46:47,437
Thanks so much.

842
00:46:47,437 --> 00:46:50,207
Yeah,
so that first part happened under my watch

843
00:46:50,207 --> 00:46:52,359
when I was the
son of this program manager.

844
00:46:53,694 --> 00:46:54,695
Yes. And that

845
00:46:54,695 --> 00:46:58,916
in the on the ground, his failure was it's
a totally different design.

846
00:46:58,916 --> 00:47:01,919
And the Northrop Grumman team
and the NASA booster team,

847
00:47:03,420 --> 00:47:06,123
did the due diligence to

848
00:47:06,123 --> 00:47:08,408
clear clear the clear that work.

849
00:47:08,408 --> 00:47:11,078
And there was no,

850
00:47:11,078 --> 00:47:14,298
no nothing there to indict the booster.

851
00:47:14,348 --> 00:47:16,083
We're flying today.

852
00:47:16,083 --> 00:47:19,086
And the same thing for the

853
00:47:19,203 --> 00:47:21,722
for the booster that was on the Vulcan.

854
00:47:21,722 --> 00:47:24,308
We went through the same activity
and cleared it both.

855
00:47:24,308 --> 00:47:27,177
So it didn't indicted. And there's been,

856
00:47:27,177 --> 00:47:29,313
I know

857
00:47:29,313 --> 00:47:33,634
we talked about it
at at some point in time along the way,

858
00:47:33,817 --> 00:47:37,054
especially right after
the one on the Vulcan had its issue and,

859
00:47:38,972 --> 00:47:41,008
the team team close that action out

860
00:47:41,008 --> 00:47:44,011
and it did not come up,

861
00:47:44,494 --> 00:47:47,397
in Lori's IFR or the agency IFR.

862
00:47:50,851 --> 00:47:52,236
Our next question is from

863
00:47:52,236 --> 00:47:55,239
Denise Chow with NBC.

864
00:47:56,490 --> 00:47:57,541
Hi. Thanks very much.

865
00:47:57,541 --> 00:48:01,345
I was wondering if you guys have
any details on launch opportunities

866
00:48:01,745 --> 00:48:04,748
beyond April in case those are needed.

867
00:48:05,365 --> 00:48:06,900
So my answer to that is

868
00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:09,903
we are focused on April.

869
00:48:09,903 --> 00:48:13,657
I've said in the past that, you know, yes,
there are opportunities in other months,

870
00:48:13,657 --> 00:48:16,643
but right now
we are solely focused on April.

871
00:48:17,160 --> 00:48:19,179
We'll take another question
from the phone.

872
00:48:19,179 --> 00:48:22,382
This is from Paul Brinkman
with Aerospace America.

873
00:48:25,319 --> 00:48:28,388
Yes. Thanks for taking my question.

874
00:48:28,388 --> 00:48:33,126
I'm just trying to, to go
back to the hydrogen and helium issues.

875
00:48:33,927 --> 00:48:37,297
There were problems
with weeks in Artemis one.

876
00:48:37,297 --> 00:48:40,951
We did hear that there were fixes

877
00:48:40,951 --> 00:48:44,855
made to kind of make sure
that that wouldn't be a problem again.

878
00:48:45,155 --> 00:48:48,809
Then there were similar problems
with Artemis two.

879
00:48:48,809 --> 00:48:53,397
I'm just wondering, does NASA feel like
it has a really firm grasp on why

880
00:48:53,397 --> 00:48:57,234
these leaks occur on the launch pad now,
and what is being done

881
00:48:57,234 --> 00:49:01,405
to make sure that Artemis three doesn't
start off with the same problem?

882
00:49:03,123 --> 00:49:03,507
Yeah.

883
00:49:03,507 --> 00:49:07,444
So I feel like right now
we're in a better place than we have

884
00:49:07,444 --> 00:49:10,447
been since we started this endeavor in,

885
00:49:10,547 --> 00:49:13,533
the team's got an extensive fall tree.

886
00:49:13,867 --> 00:49:17,187
And I think they're
looking in the right areas.

887
00:49:17,838 --> 00:49:21,959
There's quite a bit of evidence
that that says that those,

888
00:49:24,127 --> 00:49:26,613
Teflon seals

889
00:49:26,613 --> 00:49:31,585
that are used in that area,
if they're assembled

890
00:49:31,585 --> 00:49:35,922
for some length of time
and they're or they're,

891
00:49:38,608 --> 00:49:40,377
Or there's any

892
00:49:40,377 --> 00:49:43,714
a little bit of a, of,

893
00:49:44,765 --> 00:49:49,469
a flaw in,
or they don't fit exactly right.

894
00:49:50,220 --> 00:49:53,874
In other words, you know,
you need to cherry pick the seal,

895
00:49:54,574 --> 00:49:57,444
but the I think the key thing
that they're, they're starting to hone

896
00:49:57,444 --> 00:50:00,447
in on is in talking,

897
00:50:00,597 --> 00:50:03,450
talking back with the supplier

898
00:50:03,450 --> 00:50:06,453
and then doing the investigative work
themselves.

899
00:50:06,486 --> 00:50:11,124
Is, you know, we
we assemble that interface,

900
00:50:11,675 --> 00:50:18,181
that interface
in, in the VAB, and it's, it's, it's

901
00:50:18,181 --> 00:50:22,135
they're assembled like that
for quite some time before we roll out.

902
00:50:23,036 --> 00:50:23,487
Right.

903
00:50:23,487 --> 00:50:26,723
And so I think there's some good evidence
that's

904
00:50:26,723 --> 00:50:29,943
leaning towards
that material can flow and set.

905
00:50:31,028 --> 00:50:33,663
And it,

906
00:50:33,663 --> 00:50:36,366
it looks to me like

907
00:50:36,366 --> 00:50:38,335
based on the limited data that we've got

908
00:50:38,335 --> 00:50:41,338
and the experience
we got from head from our one,

909
00:50:41,755 --> 00:50:44,424
that we're going to be in a good posture

910
00:50:44,424 --> 00:50:47,427
when we roll out.

911
00:50:47,944 --> 00:50:48,845
This next time.

912
00:50:48,845 --> 00:50:51,848
And that's I think it's,
you know, as Lori allude to, we don't

913
00:50:51,998 --> 00:50:54,718
we don't, we don't feel like
we need another wet dress.

914
00:50:54,718 --> 00:50:58,238
And this is one of those opportunities
where I think we need to be.

915
00:50:58,588 --> 00:51:00,624
I think we're being,

916
00:51:00,624 --> 00:51:03,627
we're using good technical judgment and

917
00:51:03,727 --> 00:51:06,963
and being bold, making bold decisions
about what we do.

918
00:51:07,097 --> 00:51:08,965
Obviously,

919
00:51:08,965 --> 00:51:11,768
we don't want it to leak, but,

920
00:51:11,768 --> 00:51:14,938
I'm highly confident
in the technical team's ability, and

921
00:51:15,072 --> 00:51:18,809
and they're saying basically
the same words that I'm parroting.

922
00:51:18,809 --> 00:51:19,409
Back to you.

923
00:51:21,428 --> 00:51:22,629
Our next question is from

924
00:51:22,629 --> 00:51:25,615
Micah Madan Berg
with the Wall Street Journal.

925
00:51:27,367 --> 00:51:28,568
Hey. Good afternoon.

926
00:51:28,568 --> 00:51:32,906
I wanted to take one more shot at the
probabilistic risk assessment discussion.

927
00:51:33,390 --> 00:51:37,227
In 2022,
I think it was Mike Sarafin did talk about

928
00:51:37,677 --> 00:51:40,747
a 1 in 125 potential loss,

929
00:51:41,414 --> 00:51:44,968
scenario
for the Orion vehicle on Artemis one.

930
00:51:45,418 --> 00:51:49,022
I just even with the caveats
about Artemis

931
00:51:49,106 --> 00:51:51,541
to the differences
and the small amount of data

932
00:51:51,541 --> 00:51:55,712
that that John talked about,
can you at least provide a comparable for,

933
00:51:56,313 --> 00:51:59,316
that number, the one, the one to,

934
00:51:59,499 --> 00:52:02,619
you know, n number for, Orion for items?

935
00:52:02,619 --> 00:52:07,440
Two things like, I'll just say we've
addressed the risk question several times.

936
00:52:07,440 --> 00:52:09,242
I think if we have more follow up to do,

937
00:52:09,242 --> 00:52:11,645
we can follow up with reporters
separately.

938
00:52:11,645 --> 00:52:14,131
We have plenty more questions to get to.

939
00:52:14,131 --> 00:52:15,866
So we're going to go ahead and do that.

940
00:52:15,866 --> 00:52:19,419
We do want to take one more question
on the phone from Marsha

941
00:52:19,419 --> 00:52:21,188
Smith with Space Policy Online.

942
00:52:23,156 --> 00:52:24,241
Thanks so much.

943
00:52:24,241 --> 00:52:26,643
My question actually
was about Orion as well.

944
00:52:26,643 --> 00:52:30,514
We've been spending all this time
talking about specialists and ISPs

945
00:52:30,964 --> 00:52:33,533
and the tests on those systems.

946
00:52:33,533 --> 00:52:36,153
Could you just give us an update on
when the last time

947
00:52:36,153 --> 00:52:39,789
the Orion service
module systems had been tested,

948
00:52:40,173 --> 00:52:44,077
and does the Orion service module
only fire once?

949
00:52:44,678 --> 00:52:48,448
It only has to work once in order
to get them around the moon and back home.

950
00:52:48,632 --> 00:52:51,635
Could you just walk us
through that part of the flight?

951
00:52:52,235 --> 00:52:53,253
Yeah.

952
00:52:53,253 --> 00:52:57,541
I don't know the last time that we've run
any test on the

953
00:52:58,742 --> 00:53:00,076
service module.

954
00:53:00,076 --> 00:53:03,713
But I know Norm's here,
and he can talk about

955
00:53:03,713 --> 00:53:06,716
relative to how they utilize the

956
00:53:06,900 --> 00:53:10,770
the propulsion system
on, on on the service module,

957
00:53:10,770 --> 00:53:13,773
which I think is important relative
to this conversation.

958
00:53:14,374 --> 00:53:17,227
Yeah. Service module. We depend on a lot.

959
00:53:17,227 --> 00:53:21,631
Obviously, 
a lot of the, critical burns are done.

960
00:53:22,265 --> 00:53:27,454
TLI is, is done with the service module,
three domes, engines.

961
00:53:27,454 --> 00:53:31,441
We have, series
of, jets on there as well.

962
00:53:31,441 --> 00:53:34,828
So, it's critical to the mission,

963
00:53:35,078 --> 00:53:40,500
and we use it until the very last day
when we, jettison it and Orion comes home.

964
00:53:43,169 --> 00:53:44,404
Another one from the fron.

965
00:53:44,404 --> 00:53:45,989
We have Ryan Keaton with NASA.

966
00:53:45,989 --> 00:53:48,992
Spaceflight.com.

967
00:53:49,826 --> 00:53:50,977
Thanks very much for your time.

968
00:53:50,977 --> 00:53:53,096
I just want to make sure
I understand this correctly.

969
00:53:53,096 --> 00:53:56,099
You said you're not going to be doing
another wet dress rehearsal.

970
00:53:56,166 --> 00:53:56,700
I'm just wondering

971
00:53:56,700 --> 00:54:00,487
if you're going to be doing any tanking
at all, like a partial tanking test

972
00:54:00,487 --> 00:54:03,373
or an integrity test,
or are you absolutely set

973
00:54:03,373 --> 00:54:06,476
that the first time
you're going to tank this rocket from now

974
00:54:06,476 --> 00:54:09,479
on is going to be for a launch attempt,
and there are no other scenarios?

975
00:54:09,579 --> 00:54:11,164
Thank you.

976
00:54:11,164 --> 00:54:12,365
Appreciate the question.

977
00:54:12,365 --> 00:54:16,620
Yeah, we've done a lot of talking about
this and and what kind of testing might,

978
00:54:16,686 --> 00:54:17,887
might be beneficial.

979
00:54:17,887 --> 00:54:19,990
And at this point,
we've demonstrated that

980
00:54:19,990 --> 00:54:23,977
the seals that we have are the best seals
we've ever seen, on the SLS.

981
00:54:23,977 --> 00:54:29,549
And not that this should 
and so in our opinion, there's,

982
00:54:29,549 --> 00:54:32,769
there's not a lot
more to be gained from that.

983
00:54:32,769 --> 00:54:36,389
So we are as I
and as I indicated previously,

984
00:54:36,389 --> 00:54:40,343
the next time we tank the the vehicle
will be when we're attempting to launch.

985
00:54:42,595 --> 00:54:45,298
Our next question is from Nicole Mortara

986
00:54:45,298 --> 00:54:48,301
from the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation.

987
00:54:49,119 --> 00:54:50,403
Hi. Laurie, this is for you.

988
00:54:50,403 --> 00:54:54,841
I know, I know that you mentioned
that you're focused on April, with,

989
00:54:54,841 --> 00:55:00,030
launch attempt, but is is there any way
we get an update, like just for May?

990
00:55:00,030 --> 00:55:03,483
Because for media, it's very difficult to,

991
00:55:03,750 --> 00:55:07,137
get any hotel rooms
or anything like that booked.

992
00:55:07,387 --> 00:55:10,373
So is there any way
we'll have an updated calendar?

993
00:55:11,057 --> 00:55:14,244
I understand, I understand,

994
00:55:14,244 --> 00:55:18,064
and I hear you, as I said, right now,
we are very focused on April.

995
00:55:18,348 --> 00:55:21,785
If it starts to look like that, 
could be a challenge.

996
00:55:21,785 --> 00:55:22,886
We'll reconsider.

997
00:55:22,886 --> 00:55:25,889
But at this point,
we're very focused on April.

998
00:55:26,406 --> 00:55:26,639
All right.

999
00:55:26,639 --> 00:55:28,591
We'll come back into
the room here in the blue.

1000
00:55:31,561 --> 00:55:32,162
Zachary.

1001
00:55:32,162 --> 00:55:33,163
Spectrum news.

1002
00:55:33,163 --> 00:55:38,168
I wanted to ask either
Sean or, John, this question.

1003
00:55:38,168 --> 00:55:42,088
You guys, last time we had the flight
readiness review,

1004
00:55:42,339 --> 00:55:44,224
we were talking about repetition.

1005
00:55:44,224 --> 00:55:45,759
Repetition of your cruise.

1006
00:55:45,759 --> 00:55:50,814
If there was a reason that the VAB
had to come back into use and the rocket

1007
00:55:50,814 --> 00:55:54,901
had to go back, you wanted your cruise
to continue to practice.

1008
00:55:54,901 --> 00:55:58,588
Can you go a little bit in on
how the past couple of weeks

1009
00:55:58,888 --> 00:56:03,026
have been for both of your cruise
to get ready to this point?

1010
00:56:04,561 --> 00:56:06,179
Well, I will tell you that,

1011
00:56:06,179 --> 00:56:09,399
we've had a lot of work to do,
coming back from the VAB.

1012
00:56:09,399 --> 00:56:12,986
So our crews have been very busy
with, reopening

1013
00:56:12,986 --> 00:56:16,139
the vehicle volumes
to do the flight termination systems work.

1014
00:56:16,473 --> 00:56:17,707
I mentioned earlier today

1015
00:56:17,707 --> 00:56:21,961
that we had the time to do
another closeout crew demo in the baby.

1016
00:56:21,961 --> 00:56:26,316
We took advantage of that opportunity,
to make sure that we were able to execute

1017
00:56:26,316 --> 00:56:31,254
to our timelines and keep our closeout
crew, sharp and ready to go on launch day.

1018
00:56:31,805 --> 00:56:36,393
And, you know, if we had a more extended, 
time in the VAB,

1019
00:56:36,393 --> 00:56:39,746
we probably would have done some more
launch team training simulations.

1020
00:56:40,447 --> 00:56:41,965
We really didn't have the time to do that,

1021
00:56:41,965 --> 00:56:45,085
and we don't really think we needed to do
that, given the short,

1022
00:56:45,085 --> 00:56:48,838
VAB turnaround time that we,
we had this time that we expect to have.

1023
00:56:51,091 --> 00:56:53,793
You know, maybe once to mention
some of the other things.

1024
00:56:53,793 --> 00:56:55,044
Yeah.

1025
00:56:55,044 --> 00:56:57,847
Well, talking about the flight control
team and the readiness, obviously

1026
00:56:57,847 --> 00:57:00,834
we've used the time to, to do,

1027
00:57:00,884 --> 00:57:03,887
a few more sims,
a few more practice sessions.

1028
00:57:04,771 --> 00:57:08,458
We've done, I think, over this whole,
journey for Artemis

1029
00:57:08,525 --> 00:57:14,581
two, about 126 days
worth of, simulations, both standalone

1030
00:57:14,581 --> 00:57:17,851
with the crew, with the flight control
team, with the integrated,

1031
00:57:18,384 --> 00:57:21,838
engineering teams, as well
with the mission management teams.

1032
00:57:22,238 --> 00:57:26,042
And so we've not only focused
on specific training, but fully,

1033
00:57:26,559 --> 00:57:27,594
full integrated training.

1034
00:57:27,594 --> 00:57:30,597
So we're still taking advantage of that.

1035
00:57:30,747 --> 00:57:35,185
Since, February,
we continue to hone the teams.

1036
00:57:35,435 --> 00:57:37,770
The teams are working very well together.

1037
00:57:37,770 --> 00:57:41,191
And at the end of the day,
I'm fully confident that if we have

1038
00:57:41,191 --> 00:57:44,160
any problems, it's integrated team
that's going to pull us through.

1039
00:57:44,160 --> 00:57:45,445
That means the crew

1040
00:57:45,445 --> 00:57:49,682
and the ground teams working together
as one in support of the mission.

1041
00:57:49,682 --> 00:57:52,469
So we use this time wisely.

1042
00:57:52,469 --> 00:57:55,088
And, you know,
we hope it all goes nominal.

1043
00:57:55,088 --> 00:57:57,323
But if it doesn't,
you got the best teams on

1044
00:57:57,323 --> 00:57:59,259
and off the planet
to take care of any problems.

1045
00:58:00,743 --> 00:58:02,645
And we have time for one final question.

1046
00:58:02,645 --> 00:58:03,997
We'll take that from the phone.

1047
00:58:03,997 --> 00:58:07,534
That will be, Christopher MC
with the Hudson Star Observer.

1048
00:58:09,335 --> 00:58:10,036
Thank you very much.

1049
00:58:10,036 --> 00:58:12,755
I believe this would be for Mr.
Honeycutt.

1050
00:58:12,755 --> 00:58:15,158
I understand the procedure
with the timeline,

1051
00:58:15,158 --> 00:58:18,211
and there's not going to be a tanking test
due to the life of the booster.

1052
00:58:18,478 --> 00:58:20,146
Would there be any consideration,

1053
00:58:20,146 --> 00:58:24,300
with the kind of stress of the roll
out back to the pad and maybe,

1054
00:58:24,567 --> 00:58:28,555
changing out those two seals,
before the first launch attempt?

1055
00:58:28,555 --> 00:58:31,558
Or is that just not going to be
part of the procedure?

1056
00:58:31,958 --> 00:58:34,944
That's not going to be
part of the procedure.

1057
00:58:38,164 --> 00:58:38,848
All right.

1058
00:58:38,848 --> 00:58:41,851
And with that,
I will go ahead and conclude today.

1059
00:58:41,851 --> 00:58:45,338
Thank you very much to our participants
for participating today.

1060
00:58:45,755 --> 00:58:50,009
You can stay tuned
for further updates on NASA.gov.

1061
00:58:50,009 --> 00:58:51,594
And we're going to go ahead and pop up

1062
00:58:51,594 --> 00:58:56,099
this specific URL where you can find
that information about our progress.

1063
00:58:56,099 --> 00:58:58,768
NASA.gov slash Artemis.

1064
00:58:58,768 --> 00:59:00,220
Thank you all for joining us today.